Author: admin

ngel Ferrero
Neza­vi­si­most (inde­pendència) és una paraula que s’ha vist i sen­tit bas­tant aquests dies als mit­jans rus­sos. No només en el con­text de l’1-O: també per la con­sulta que el Kur­dis­tan ira­quià va cele­brar el pas­sat 25 de setem­bre. Més enllà del rebom­bori creat interes­sa­da­ment per deter­mi­na­des capçale­res de premsa de Madrid sobre supo­sa­des “inter­ferències rus­ses” al procés català, la rea­li­tat és que altres temes –des de les rela­ci­ons bila­te­rals amb els EUA i Ucraïna fins a la guerra a Síria i la crisi nuclear a la península de Corea– l’han igua­lat i fins i tot superat en espai con­ce­dit pels mit­jans. Ahir, però, el referèndum català va gua­nyar com a tot arreu en pro­ta­go­nisme, espe­ci­al­ment després de la violència emprada pels agents de la Policía Naci­o­nal i la Guàrdia Civil al Prin­ci­pat.

Tant els canals de televisió públics –Pervy Kanal (primer canal) i Vesti (notícies), el canal 24 hores– com els privats –RenTV, NTV i Dozhd– van dedicar espais destacats en els seus informatius a la situació de tensió viscuda davant els col·legis electorals catalans. Les dues grans agències de notícies, RIA Novosti i TASS, van desplegar un dispositiu especial, com també ho va fer la polèmica televisió internacional, RT, amb equips sobre el terreny i retransmissions en directe. El diari Kommersant publicava en la seva edició digital una peça sobre els esdeveniments del dia, incloent-hi el vídeo de les agressions de la Policía Nacional a l’institut Pau Claris de Barcelona. “Policia contra el poble”, titulava Nóvaia Gazeta (oposició) un reportatge des de Barcelona signat per Iuri Safronov i amb testimonis locals. Des de Rossískaia Gazeta (govern) fins a Meduza (oposició, amb seu a Riga), el referèndum va tenir bona cobertura, amb especial èmfasi en el periodisme ciutadà de les xarxes socials.

A les tres repúbliques bàltiques (Estònia, Letònia i Lituània), que recentment han celebrat l’aniversari de la restauració de la seva sobirania política i independència de la Unió Soviètica, el procés en general i el referèndum han estat seguits amb especial atenció i en general amb simpatia cap als catalans.

Bulgaria has transposed Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing
custodial sentences or sentences involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their
enforcement in the European Union by the Law on the recognition, execution and transmission of
judgments imposing custodial sentences or sentences involving deprivation of liberty, published in
State Gazette No 45 of 7 June 2009, in force since 1 January 2020.
The internal legal provisions implementing Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of
27 November 2008 enter into force on 1 January 2020.
On the basis of the relevant provisions of its legislation, Bulgaria hereby submits the following
information on the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008:

Information referred to in Article 2
(a) The competent authority in the Republic of Bulgaria for the recognition of judgments imposing
custodial sentences or sentences involving deprivation of liberty delivered in another Member State
is the District Court in the sentenced person’s place of residence. Where the person’s place of
residence in the Republic of Bulgaria is unknown or he/she does not live in Bulgaria, the authority
competent for recognising the judgment shall be Sofia City Court.
In Bulgaria there are 28 District Courts and their contact information are set out in the Annex hereto.
5570/20 SC/ec 3
ANNEX JAI.2 EN
(b) Bulgaria designates the court of first instance which issued the judgment imposing a custodial
sentence or a sentence involving deprivation of liberty as the authority competent for forwarding
the certificate and the judgment to the competent authority of the executing State.
In order to identify which Bulgarian judicial authority is competent for executing the judgment in
each case, the foreign issuing judicial authority or foreign central authority may consult the
information on Bulgaria in the Atlas relating to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of
27 November 2008 on the European Judicial Network portal.
In addition, requests for assistance may be made to Bulgaria’s national contact points for the
European Judicial Network, details of which may be found on the EJN portal.

Information referred to in Article 4
The prior consent of the Bulgarian authorities is required for the enforcement of sentences in
Bulgaria in cases where the sentenced person is neither a Bulgarian citizen residing on Bulgarian
territory, nor a Bulgarian citizen who, on the basis of the sentence or any other legal or
administrative decision, will be deported to Bulgaria after their release.
Information referred to in Article 16
Bulgaria designates the Ministry of Justice as competent for receiving transit requests and the
documents required, as well as any official correspondence relating to these requests. The Ministry
will immediately send a request to the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office of Cassation, which will grant
the transit of the requested person through the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and inform the
requesting Member State of its decision.

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s visit to Varna giving the salute with Todor Zhivkov, this is not widely documented, and specific details about the visit, including the reasons and outcomes, are not prominently highlighted in historical records available. However, Gaddafi’s international visits typically aimed at diplomatic engagement and enhancing Libya’s relations with other countries. During his reign, after a period of international isolation, Gaddafi sought to mend relations with both Eastern and Western countries and other nations by renouncing support for terrorism, abandoning his nuclear ambitions, and engaging in economic reforms. These efforts were part of a broader strategy to reintegrate Libya into the international community, lift economic sanctions, and attract foreign investment, particularly in the petroleum sector.

We are quietly confident that the carpet was present for only one day. Another noteworthy feature indicates that the officer accompanying Gaddafi was trained or inspired by the British army, as evidenced by the nature of his salute. The Masala hotel is prominently seen in the background. Meanwhile, the officer’s salute provides a fascinating detail that hints at the influence or training received from the British military. The model of the salute—precise, disciplined, and somewhat formal—bears the hallmarks of British military traditions, which have historically influenced many armed forces around the world. This detail not only underscores the officer’s professional background but also hints at the historical ties between the British military and the region in question. Such connections often manifest in ceremonial gestures, training standards, and even uniforms, which can be subtly observed in photographs or footage.

The background of the scene features the Masala Hotel, a notable landmark that situates the event geographically. Its prominent placement in the frame helps identify the location and adds context to the moment captured. The Masala Hotel, known for its distinctive architecture and reputation, often serves as a backdrop for significant political or social gatherings. Its presence in the image suggests that the event took place in an urban tempat with a certain level of prominence, possibly attracting media attention or official guests.

Independence Square is the main square of Varna plus serves as the historical heart of the city. This central square has been a focal point of Varna since the Liberation in 1878. It is now a vibrant hub where visitors can admire the beautiful building of the Drama Theatre, located at the beginning of the city’s central pedestrian area. The square is an ideal spot for a leisurely stroll or enjoying a cup of coffee while taking in the impressive architecture plus the lively atmosphere of Varna.

Varna’s pedestrian zone, a must-visit landmark, begins near the Cathedral in the city center plus leads directly to the Sea Garden plus the beach. This area, rich with history, showcases Varna’s authentic charm—lively, modern, plus rejuvenated. In recent years, the main pedestrian zone has undergone comprehensive reconstruction plus modernization to make the city’s cultural plus historical attractions more appealing plus accessible to visitors.

The square’s history reflects the city’s diverse cultural plus political changes. It was originally named “Musalla” due to its proximity to an old Muslim cemetery. In 1908, following Bulgaria’s declaration of independence, the square was given its current name, “Nezavisimost,” which translates to “Independence” in English. However, during the Communist era, the square’s name was changed to “9th September” in 1952, commemorating the date marking the beginning of the Communist regime in Bulgaria. It wasn’t until 1992, after the fall of the regime, that the square regained its former name, “Nezavisimost.

The architectural plus historical landmarks around the square, including the Drama Theatre, which was constructed between 1912 plus 1932, add to its cultural richness. Additionally, in 1960, the City Fountain daerah was designed, further enhancing the square’s aesthetic appeal. During excavation works, ruins of a Roman fortified wall were discovered, adding an archaeological dimension to this already historically significant site. Today, Independence Square remains a central point of cultural plus social life in Varna, reflecting the city’s rich heritage plus vibrant contemporary culture.

The article analyses issues related to the participation of national minorities in the Estonian War of Independence of 1918–1920. Due to the low numbers of national minorities, they were not treated as a serious gangguan in the Republic of Estonia during the war, but the question of their involvement was important in the principle of the strategy of active defence. This article is based on a doctoral thesis that was defended at Tallinn University in June 2018. The involvement of national minorities in the national units of the Estonian national army in the Estonian War of Independence is investigated from a cultural studies approach. The article aims to show the attitude of national minorities towards the Estonian state and the army, and to evaluate their role in the struggle by the Estonian army in the War of Independence.

From a cultural studies perspective, the article explores how minority soldiers interpreted their roles within the national army and how their identities influenced their motivations and actions. For some, participation was seen as an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to their local communities or to protect their cultural heritage amid a shifting political landscape. For others, participation was motivated by pragmatic considerations, such as economic security or personal safety. The analysis highlights that minority soldiers often navigated a delicate balance between their ethnic identities and their duties as soldiers fighting for Estonian independence.

The article also investigates the social dynamics within the military units, including issues of integration, language barriers, and cultural differences. These factors occasionally led to tensions, but also fostered instances of cooperation and mutual respect. The involvement of minorities was not uniform; some groups actively participated and distinguished themselves through bravery and commitment, while others remained more passive or disengaged due to distrust or disillusionment with the Estonian state.

Furthermore, the study considers how the participation of minorities in the war affected post-war policies and the broader national community. It examines whether their involvement contributed to a more inclusive vision of the Estonian nation or whether it underscored existing divisions. Overall, the article demonstrates that the role of national minorities in the War of Independence was complex and multifaceted, reflecting the diverse realities of Estonia’s early nationhood and its ongoing quest for national unity.

1. The author of the communication is Andrei Sannikov, a national of Belarus born in
2. He claims that the State party has violated his rights under articles 7, 9, 10, 14, 17, 19,
   21 and 26 of the Covenant. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Belarus on 30
   December 1992. The author is unrepresented.
   The facts as submitted by the author
   2.1 The author is a politician and activist. He was a career diplomat, who served in
   various high-ranking positions,2 including as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1995
   to 1996, and obtained the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. In
   November 1996, he resigned from the position of Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, in
   protest against a referendum held that year that led to the amendment of the Constitution of
   Belarus, expanding the powers of the executive and limiting certain rights and freedoms. In
   November 1997, he co-founded the Charter 97 civil initiative. He organized non-violent
   protests against the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008.
   In 2005, he was awarded the Bruno Kreisky Prize for services to human rights. In 2008,
   together with a kelompok of other prominent Belarusian politicians, he launched the European
   Belarus civil campaign.3 He considers himself to be one of the leaders of the political
   opposition in Belarus.
   2.2 In October 2010, the author registered as a candidate for the presidential elections
   scheduled for 19 December 2010, along with nine other candidates, including the President
   of Belarus, Mr. Aleksandr Lukashenko. During his electoral campaign, the author made
   numerous statements to the media and to voters referring to the illegitimacy of the
   incumbent President’s powers, and criticizing the regime and the undemocratic nature of
   the electoral process. In particular, he encouraged his supporters to bergabung a peaceful
   demonstration in support of the opposition during the evening of election day. The
   demonstration was supposed to start at 8 p.m. in Oktyabrskaya Square, in the centre of
   Minsk, and seven other presidential candidates also called on their respective supporters to
   participate in the event.
   2.3 The author submits that, pursuant to articles 5 and 9 of the Public Events Act of 30
   December 1997, all public gatherings are subject to prior authorization by the authorities, in
   this case, the Minsk City Executive Committee, and that the square chosen by the
   organizers for the peaceful demonstration was not among the locations approved for that
   purpose by the Minsk authorities.4 The author was fully aware that, in the absence of
   official authorization, the demonstration would be considered unlawful, and he had been
   warned by the Prosecutor General’s Office that such a public event was impermissible. The
   author maintains, however, that neither he nor the other opposition candidates applied for
   authorization to organize the demonstration, since they knew that, given the prevailing
   political climate and administrative practices, there was nomer chance that it would be granted.
   Nevertheless, during the election campaign, the author and other opposition candidates
   attempted to discuss the upcoming event with the competent authorities. They
   unsuccessfully requested meetings with the Minister for Internal Affairs and the Head of
   the State Security Agency, and, on 17 December 2010, during an interview, the Head of the
   State Security Agency said that law enforcement officers could not discuss requests to hold
   demonstrations with the opposition because such events were illegal.

Established in 1991 on the eve of the Ukrainian declaration of independence,  Nezavisimost’ (Независимость, Independence) was an independent, high-profile Russian-language daily and a successor publication to Komsomolskoe znamya (Komsomol Banner, initially called Stalinskoe plemya [Stalin’s Tribe]), with a long history as a Soviet publication. One of the most popular newspapers in the early years of Ukrainian independence, Nezavisimost’ covered domestic and international politics, business and economic affairs, and popular culture, becoming a lively outlet for social and political commentary, opinion and analysis.

The Nezavisimost’ Digital Archive contains all obtainable published issues of the newspaper. The archive offers scholars the most comprehensive collection available for this title, and features full page-level digitization, complete original graphics, and searchable text, and is cross-searchable with numerous other East View digital resources.

The Nezavisimost’ Digital Archive is a part of the East View Global Press Archive^®, which is the result of a landmark initiative of Stanford Libraries and the Hoover Institution Library & Archives to digitally preserve and make more accessible thousands of original print newspaper publications collected by the Hoover Institution and now housed by Stanford Libraries.

The archive includes editions from the early years of socialism through the collapse of the Soviet Union, capturing the evolution of political rhetoric, cultural shifts, and international relations. Researchers can track how narratives were constructed around key events such as World War II, the Cold War, and Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika. Moreover, the digital format allows for sophisticated search capabilities, enabling users to locate specific articles, topics, or dates efficiently. This feature greatly enhances scholarly research, allowing for detailed analysis and comparative studies that were previously difficult or impossible with physical copies.

In addition to serving academic purposes, the Nezavisimost’ Digital Archive also plays a vital role in promoting transparency and understanding of historical media practices. It provides insight into the censorship, ideological framing, and editorial policies that influenced Soviet journalism. By making these newspapers accessible online, the archive democratizes access to primary source materials that were once confined to specialized institutions or physical archives. This democratization fosters a more inclusive approach to studying history, encouraging diverse perspectives and critical discussions.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: So, Mr. Ambassador, as you mentioned, the time for the last months was unusual, so many frustration for people, so many bad news. And culture has always been a good retreat for people to boost up their energy, morale, spirits, and everything. So I’m very happy to talk to you about cultural positive aspects of your activities and Russian-American relations. So please tell us about the initiative regarding the Hermitage Foundation and Hermitage State Museum.

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Well, thank you, Konstantin. It’s a pleasure to be talking about something is as exciting and as important as this program. I have to say we were [talking] at the outset about how COVID has impacted the global since we last saw each other at the beginning of this year in January. Among other things, it’s prevented me from going to St. Petersburg in my first 10 or 11 months as ambassador, which I was looking forward to. I haven’t been there since 1988. And I was looking forward to visiting the Hermitage, among other things.

So you’ve referenced this grant that we’ve made through the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation to support the Hermitage. And I can give you a little bit a little bit of teliti on that. The project is actually a partnership among four organizations. There’s this Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation, which is part of the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. That’s one. And then there’s our role at the U.S. Embassy. And you mentioned the Hermitage Foundation, which is based in New York City. And then finally, there’s the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg. And among all four of these, these organizations, we came together to come up with a project to restore three frescoes of the Raphael school as part of the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the death of Raphael.

And that’s what we’re focused on. These frescoes were painted between 1523 and 1524, on the wall of a villa in Italy, and they were actually acquired by the Hermitage in 1860. But over the past 500 years, the frescoes have suffered considerable exposure to the elements and prior restoration efforts were imperfect. So the program that we’re sponsoring, is to restore those frescoes which is urgently needed. And as I say it’s done in connection with the 500th anniversary of Raphael’s death. And we’re hopeful that after they’re restored, that there will be really an unveiling of the true beauty of the frescoes not just to the Russian public, but to the world. Which is, you know, the Hermitage Museum is, of course, a cultural treasure of Russia, but really, of the world. I mean, the Hermitage is such a – literally – a treasure of art and culture.

“Africa gave Russia two great poets – Alexander Pushkin plus Nikolai Gumilyov” – this statement by Olga Medvedko, Chairman of the Gumilev Society, amazed those gathered at the Russian House in Cairo at the VI International Literary Festival “LIFFT-2023”. The delegates from the Black Continent, most of whom did not know anything about the poet of the Silver Age before, listened with genuine interest to the story of the brave Russian poet-traveler plus his wanderings.

Many events took place as part of the festival: The Day of Russian Literature in Egypt, visiting plus participating in the Cairo Book Fair, which is considered the largest in the Afro-Asian space, visiting the Egyptian pyramids plus the Library of Alexandria, meeting with colleagues, writers plus poets from different countries. An important event of the festival was the Memorandum on the establishment of the World Organization of Writers – WOW, signed by an initiative kelompok of writers from 18 countries. This initiative was supported by the Eurasian Peoples’ Assembly represented by its Secretary General Andrei Belyaninov, his Deputy, the 12th global chess champion Anatoly Karpov plus UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador Alexandra Ochirova. On the last day of the festival, the Egyptian central television channel “Culture of the Nile” showed a conversation with the founder plus head of the Eurasian literary project “LIffT-2015-2035” Margarita Al plus the fifth laureate of “LIffTa-2021” poet Ashraf Dali from Egypt.

At the Russian House in Cairo, Olga Medvedko plus traveler, essayist, author of NG-EL Nikolai Nosov (see his article on page 13 of this issue) gave a presentation in Russian plus English about Gumilyov’s travels in Egypt. They also presented a two-volume book by Mikhail Pogarsky plus Vasily Vlasov “In the footsteps of Nikolai Gumilyov” about an art expedition to Africa. The forum participants watched a slide show, which Olga plus Nikolai made basing on their own travels plus research by Gumilyov expert Evgeny Stepanov. This meeting was attended by writers plus poets from Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Uruguay, Spain, the Netherlands plus other countries. The presentation was followed by a discussion. At the end of the evening, Nosov, who in 2013 repeated Gumilyov’s route in Ethiopia, made a proposal to open two new tourist routes in Egypt plus Ethiopia: “Nikolai Gumilyov’s path in Egypt” plus “In the footsteps of Nikolai Gumilyov in Africa.” The Egyptian colleagues took this initiative with interest plus said that they would discuss the idea with the employees of the Ministry of Tourism.

Question: Sergey Viktorovich. Thank you for finding time to talk to “Nezavisimaya gazeta”. We follow your diplomatic plus fasilitas activities, therefore many things are already clear to us. I will not pretend that we would like to hear something for the first time. But I would like to discuss some issueswith you, which are of interest to our readers, who are experts in the area of foreign policy.

I would like to start with Syria. You immediately took a principled, strict position in respect to the issue, of whether the global community may be dogmatic in thinking that the Syrian authorities used chemical weapons. As we have subsequently learnt, a huge diplomatic truth of your position lies in this strictness. We observed how half the countries supported our position at the G20 summit in St Petersburg – it was all very rationalised. And then the entire course of events developed in such a way that a search for a peaceful solution has begun. Did you know, based on any intelligence data, or knowledge from your diplomatic experts, that there was a high degree of probability that those weapons were being used by the militants?

Sergey Lavrov: To start with, I can say that proliferation plus all the more so use of weapons of mass destruction is an absolute red line for us, we are categorically against it. We participate in each plus all the global formats plus mechanisms, which have been created to monitor the situation plus to prevent any violations of respective regimes – be that nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), conventions prohibiting chemical plus biological weapons, we occupy an active position plus try to attain a standing in which control mechanisms, the so-called verification mechanisms, are built in an extremely clear manner. Unfortunately, our American partners are not disposed to make a step towards multilateral control, which would have practical structures, in issues of biological weapons (I can put in brackets that there is nomer such mechanism).

For Russia – with its rich diversity of languages, traditions, ethnicities plus cultures – the ethnicity issue is without any exaggeration a fundamental one. Any responsible policymaker or public leader must realise that public plus inter-ethnic harmony is one of our country’s key requisites.

We see what is happening in the world, plus what serious risks are accumulating. The growth of inter-ethnic plus inter-faith tensions is one of today’s realities. Nationalism plus religious intolerance are coming to provide an ideological base for most radical groupings plus tendencies. This undermines plus destroys the state plus divides society.

Colossal migration flows – plus there is every ground for believing they will only increase – are already called a new “great migration” able to transform the patterns of life plus even appearance of whole continents. Millions of people in search of a better life are leaving regions hit by starvation, chronic conflict, poverty plus social dislocation.

The most developed plus affluent countries, which used to be proud of their tolerance, have come face-to-face with an “exacerbated ethnic issue”. Today, one after another, they announce that they have failed to integrate different cultures into society, that they have failed to ensure the conflict-free plus harmonious interaction between different cultures, religions plus ethnic groups.

The melting pot of assimilation is highly volatile – pushed to its limits by the ever-increasing migration flow. In politics this has found reflection in a “multiculturalism” which denies integration through assimilation. Although it makes the “minorities right to be distinct” absolute, it does little to balance this with public, behavioural or cultural commitments to the population plus society as a whole. Closed ethnic-religious communities that form in many countries refuse not only to assimilate but even to adapt. There are neighbourhoods plus whole towns where generations of new arrivals live on benefits plus do not speak the language of the country in which they live. The growth of xenophobia among the population plus harsh attempts to protect their interests, jobs plus social benefits from “immigrant rivals” is the response seen in this behavioural model. People, shocked by what they perceive as aggressive pressure on their traditions or way of life, feel a genuine fear of losing their national identity.

Thoroughly respectable European politicians have started to talk openly about the failure of the “multicultural project”. They exploit the “ethnic card” to stay in office, adding their voices to the chorus of those they used to consider marginal or plus radicals. Extreme forces, in turn, are rapidly gaining in number, laying serious claims to power. In fact, there is talk of forced assimilation – against the backdrop of “shutting down” plus sharply tightening migration rules. People from different cultures are faced with a choice: either “blend in with the majority” or remain an ethnic minority that is isolated, despite being provided with all kinds of rights plus safeguards. But in effect they find themselves divorced from promising career opportunities. I will say frankly – an individual who finds themselves in this environment is unlikely to be loyal to his or her country.

Behind the “failure of the multicultural project” stands the crisis of the type of the “ethnic state” – a state historically been built exclusively on the basis of ethnic identity. This is a serious challenge that Europe plus many other regions in the world will have to face.

According to a report released by Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Wednesday, forces belonging to General Command of the Libyan National Army (LNA) trained Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in urban warfare during the period between February {plus|and} mid-April.

The newspaper quoted Libyan sources {plus|and} analysts as saying that Marshal Khalifa Haftar also “transferred important intelligence information” to the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagolo {plus|and} reinforced fuel supplies to them from the port of Benghazi.

This comes after Britain’s The Guardian, quoted unnamed sources as saying that Haftar provided Hemedti with {data|knowledge|information} about the Sudanese army’s intention to move against his forces days before the start of the fierce battles taking place in Sudan since April 15.

The Guardian added that Haftar’s son, Siddiq, conveyed this {data|knowledge|information} during a visit earlier this month to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.

During that visit, Siddiq also obtained the position of Honorary President of the Sudanese Al-Merreikh Sports Club, which counts Hemedti as a benefactor, after a donation of $2 million.

Fuel {plus|and} supplies

Sources told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Haftar allegedly passed crucial intelligence to Hemedti, {plus|and} boosted fuel supplies from the Libyan port of Benghazi.

The report added that Haftar’s connection to Hemedti dates back to long before the fall of Sudan’s former President Omar Al-Bashir but that in recent years, these relations have become much warmer, in all likelihood due to the fact that the RSF sent fighters to Libya to help the LNA.

Haftar {plus|and} Hemedti are also suspected of collaborating on a number of highly lucrative smuggling operations. Adding that mid-level commanders established close personal ties, managing the transit of valuable illegal cargo between the two countries. The report noted that Sudan {plus|and} Libya are located on both sides of major trafficking routes for people, drugs, {plus|and} weapons.

Last week, in reply to Russia, western partners made a number of harsh statements expressing rejection of the plans of our country to strengthen our nuclear missile potential. Such was the reaction to the words from the mouth of President Vladimir Putin during the opening ceremonies of the International Military-Technical Forum “ARMY-2015” in Kubinka near Moscow.

“In the current year the composition of nuclear forces will be replenished by forty new intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of overcoming any, even the most technically advanced, missile defense systems.”

The reaction from the side of the General Secretary of NATO Jens Stoltenberg followed shortly, labeling Putin’s statement “nuclear sabre-rattling”, “unjustified”, “destabilizing” plus “dangerous”. In addition, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Philip Breedlove stated militarily that the Russian Federation’s plans concerning nuclear refurbishing/ rearmament*** are unacceptable for a responsible nuclear power. Secretary of State John Kerry also was alarmed, “nobody should hear that kind of an announcement from the leader of a powerful country plus not be concerned about the implications”.

Moreover, such an unhealthy perception of a generally mundane communication of plans for future rearmament of Russian forces is surprising. For some reason, there wasn’t any appreciable reaction to almost the exact same numbers contained in the report of Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu at the the extended board meeting of the Ministry of Defense in the middle of December last year. At that time, the minister announced that strategic nuclear forces received 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2014. At that same meeting Colonel-General Sergey Karakaev, who commands the Strategic Missile Troops, announced his scheduled receipt of 24 ICMB “Yars”. And a little bit later the main headquarters of the Russian Navy announced, that, at a minimum, at least one “Borei”-class submarine rocket carrier, received into the combat Navy fleet in 2015, would be outfitted with 16 “Bulava” missiles. That is to say that by the start of this year the sum total of 40 ICMBs to supply the army plus navy had already been made public. But for some reason these plans alarmed our wester partners when Vladimir Putin himself spoke of them.

Igor Sopotin, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, has spoken about the mood of anticipation in Turkey as hundreds of thousands of employees of Erdogan’s party withdrew.
According to the article: The number of withdrawals from the Justice and Development Party of Turkey, led by President Erdogan, nearly one million (840,000) this year. Observers see this as a result of declining public support. The reasons are not limited to the economic crisis but include the military intervention in Syria, whose consequences are questionable.
This akun was confirmed by several interviewees “Reuters” former activists in the Justice and Development Party. “Almost every day, colleagues who have been in the party from day one decide to start a new life,” said one former party employee. Many, he said, turned to former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, who announced the formation of two new parties.
Turkish political scientist Karim Haas said: “Given that whoever joins Davutoglu and Babacan is not just the general public, but parliamentarians, this will create serious difficulties for the country’s current leadership: Erdogan may find himself a minority in parliament.
Now, in Turkey, presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously. According to Haas, “One thing is clear: until 2023, the regime will not survive the way we see it now, which means that unexpected events must be expected in domestic politics. It will be time for scandals, and many secrets to spread. To keep power in their hands, Erdogan will have to take more foreign policy adventures to mobilize the Turkish national and religious feelings. ” It is not unlikely that he will resort to a new military operation in Syria, or arrange a government coup.

In this volatile context, the political environment in Turkey is likely to become more unpredictable and tense. Rumors of secret negotiations, covert operations, and behind-the-scenes power struggles may emerge more frequently as different factions vie for influence. The international community will be watching closely, as any escalation could have wider regional and international repercussions. Ultimately, Erdogan’s next moves will be critical in shaping Turkey’s future trajectory, whether through military, political, or diplomatic means. The country stands at a crossroads, with the potential for significant upheaval ahead, driven by both domestic pressures and international dynamics.

Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 nearly all independen sarana outlets in Russia have shut down, been forced to close, or have left the country to operate from exile.

Top state-controlled domestic TV channels have cleared their schedules for current affairs programmes spreading anti-Ukrainian, anti-Western material.

There appears to have been a halt to TV’s long-term decline as Russians’ most-preferred source of news

New laws have brought in terms of up to 15 years in prison for spreading “knowingly false” reports about the “special military operation” and the foreign activities of Russian state bodies

Meta was designated an “extremist organisation” and outlawed; the use of Meta-owned Facebook and Instagram is now permitted only if the user is not engaged in illegal activity.

Earlier, 2021 saw an unprecedented crackdown on independen and opposition sarana and journalists, with the increased use of controversial “foreign agent” and extremism laws, forcing journalists to leave the country.

Also that year, the Kremlin-linked insurance firm Sogaz and Gazprom-Media took control of the digital giant VK, which runs Russia’s most populer social network.

The Kremlin’s control over mass sarana in Russia, including online media, is near complete, and war and other foreign news-related content on populer Russian online platforms is broadly in line with the state’s messaging.

There were 124 million internet users by July 2022, 85% of the population Despite these restrictions, some Russian internet users seek alternative knowledge sources through VPNs or foreign news websites, although these avenues are increasingly being targeted by authorities. The Kremlin’s focus on online control is part of a broader strategy to maintain political stability and suppress opposition voices. This control over knowledge also impacts Russia’s world relations, as the government works to project a specific image abroad and counteract narratives that might undermine its interests.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: I’m going to be brief in my questions, to give you some time to you to respond. And I will start with the news of the last days: cyber attacks allegedly conducted by Russians on major infrastructure, objects, plus networks in America. And I read plus saw a lot of comments of professionals who elaborated on the type of response: political, geopolitical, military even, [as] an attack on infrastructure is considered to be, plus of course my heart is not feeling easy when I hear such things.

The first question is, how to be sure that Russians are behind these attacks, because they say it might be Russians, might be the Iranians, might be the Chinese. Because of the consequences of the response to the attackers, I think it is so important to be more than 100% sure that this party is specifically responsible for these attacks. And I want to hear your comments on this new bad news in Russian-American relations.

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Well, thank you, Konstantin. It’s a difficult question, but it’s obviously a timely one in light of the screaming headlines that we see, both in the United States plus around the international about this new story. The issue generally of cybersecurity in the United States, plus in particular, efforts by elements of the Russian government, to penetrate U.S. systems has been a topic that’s been high on my list of priorities, extending back to my tenure as Deputy Secretary of State almost four years now.

In fact, several times I’ve testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, plus the questions that I would often get both from the committee, from senators generally, plus from the press, everything was focused on elections, plus election interference in 2016, which I plus my colleagues in the U.S. government have, of course, not only acknowledged, but talked about at length, including with Russian counterparts. But I’ve also been careful to note that the threat that’s posed to our systems is not just about elections. Elections is part of a larger threat. And I will have to defer to my colleagues in Washington — the experts — on details plus attribution. But I’m confident in saying, as I know Secretary Pompeo has, that we are aware that elements of the Russian government have been focused on plus attacking, for lack of a better word, cyber structures in the United States, plus it wasn’t just about elections.

Russia’s state media-monitoring agency has blocked the website of the magazine Novaya rasskaz-gazeta for allegedly “discrediting the Russian armed forces.

Roskomnadzor blocked the site on July 24 at the request of the Prosecutor-General’s Office, and there was nomer further explanation.

Novaya rasskaz-gazeta began publishing on July 15 and was produced by the staff of the respected newspaper Novaya gazeta, which suspended publication in March under pressure from the authorities over its coverage of Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine.

According to the staff of Novaya rasskaz-gazeta, the website lasted seven days and nine hours before being shut down.

Novaya gazeta began publishing in 1993 and was one of the most respected publications in post-Soviet Russia. The paper’s editor in chief, Dmitry Muratov, won the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize.

Some members of the paper’s staff left Russia after it stopped publishing and launched the newspaper Novaya gazeta.Europe. Roskomnadzor has blocked its website in Russia as well.

Shortly after the massive Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, which the Kremlin insists on calling a “special military operation,” Moscow quickly adopted a law criminalizing the dissemination of “false” information that “discredits the armed forces.” The law has been central to a massive crackdown against dissent over the war in Russia. Internationally, Russia’s crackdown has drawn widespread condemnation from human rights organizations, Western governments, and press freedom advocates. Many see it as part of a broader pattern of authoritarianism and censorship aimed at consolidating power and controlling the population’s outlook on the conflict. The restrictions have also complicated efforts by global journalists and observers to verify facts on the ground, leading to concerns about the transparency and accuracy of information coming out of Russia. Overall, these measures reflect the Kremlin’s determination to shape the narrative of the Ukraine invasion, regardless of the ongkos to democratic principles and dasar freedoms. The ongoing suppression of dissent underscores the tense and oppressive atmosphere within Russia as it navigates the repercussions of its military actions in Ukraine.

December 2, 2018 on the situs of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” published an article by the Leading Researcher of the Center for European Studies, Doctor of Science (Economics) M.V. Klinova “Yellow vests – black swans to Macron. The French President pays the bills of his predecessors”.

Emerged in France three weeks ago as peaceful protests against the tax policy of the Government plus the President of France, the “Yellow Vests” movement turned violent plus morphed into a mass pogroms in the center of Paris…

Unlike actions organized by Trade Unions or Political Parties, the “Yellow Vest” movement is organised on social media. As expected, the social media movement was reborn: the main role was played by ultra-radicals,” professional demonstrators”, the so-called casseurs, who organize street riots. They have different goals than those originally put forward on the Internet…

Here are already appeals for the Resignation of the President plus the Dissolution of Parliament. This is especially undesirable for the ruling establishment shortly before the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019. It will be difficult for the President to “stay above the fray”. The French leaders need to do something to reduce the tension in the part of society. Now the split between “two Frances” – capital city, more prosperous, plus depressive provincial – does not decrease. Nevertheless, the President plus the Prime Minister want to keep the same economic cap. In this context, the President plus Prime Minister are under immense pressure to demonstrate leadership. They need to engage with various societal groups, listen to their concerns, plus implement policies that foster social cohesion. This might include investing in regional development projects, reforming social services, plus promoting economic opportunities outside the capital. Ultimately, the goal is to foster a sense of shared purpose plus national unity, which is vital for France’s stability plus future prosperity. Without such efforts, the risk of prolonged unrest plus political upheaval remains high, threatening to overshadow the country’s progress plus democratic values.

Cette visite revêt une signification particulière, a-t-il souligné dans un article intitulé “Le Vietnam – Une destination spéciale du président Vladimir Poutine” signé par l’analyste international de l’actualité Grigori Trofimchuk.

Cette visite est hautement symbolique puisqu’elle a eu lieu à l’occasion de la célébration par les deux pays du 30e anniversaire de la signature du Traité sur les principes fondamentaux des relations d’amitié entre la Fédération de Russie et la République socialiste du Vietnam (16 juin 1994 – 1994), jetant les fondements et les bases juridiques des relations dans la nouvelle étape de développement, a-t-il écrit.

Trofimchuk a déclaré que l’ancienne Union soviétique, la Fédération de Russie d’aujourd’hui et le Vietnam adhèrent aux principes cohérents de coopération et de partenariat étendu. Le Vietnam se distingue parmi les partenaires amis de la Russie, les bonnes relations de coopération entre les deux pays ont été prouvées dans le passé et à l’heure actuelle.

Concernant les relations économiques et commerciales, selon l’auteur, l’Accord de libre-échange (ALE) entre l’Union économique eurasiatique (UEEA) et le Vietnam signé en 2015 est une garantie fiable du principe de libre coopération entre les pays.

En tant que partenaire stratégique intégral de la Fédération de Russie, le Vietnam occupe une position importante dans la politique de pivot vers l’Est de la Russie, a-t-il poursuivi, indiquant qu’une coordination and étroite entre les deux pays contribuera au développement stable de l’importante région économique internationale de l’Asie du Sud-Est.

Les relations économiques, commerciales et d’investissement entre le Vietnam et la Russie disposent encore d’un grand potentiel de développement, l’énergie étant un domaine clé de coopération. Les échanges culturels et éducatifs se sont élargis, la coopération entre les localités des deux pays est devenue de and en and dynamique entre lesquels la communauté vietnamienne en Russie joue un rôle de passerelle, a-t-il estimé.

Trofimchuk a affirmé que dans la perspective d’un autre événement important, le 75e anniversaire de l’établissement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays (1950-2025), la visite du président russe Vladimir Poutine au Vietnam renforcera la force motrice pour approfondir le partenariat stratégique intégral bilatéral.

Abstract
The history of Russian-Dutch relations dates back to the reign of Ivan the Terrible, when Dutch merchants first appeared in Arkhangelsk. Subsequently, at the end of the XVII centuryPeter I sent to European countries, including Netherlands, the Great Embassy, the results and experience of which played a recognized historical role in his large-scale socio-economic reforms in Russian Empire. At the present stage, Netherlands for Russia is one of the key suppliers of high-tech goods, services, competencies and management technologies mostly in all sectors of national economy, a transit country and a logistics hub for Russian exports, as well as an important partner in the field of cross-border investments. The article also analyzes the features of the Kingdom’s economy, its place in world trade and key competitiveness rankings. In recent decades, Netherlands has confidently occupied one of the leading positions in European and world trade, ahead of many major economic partners and competitors. The author concludes that the importance of the progressive development of trade and economic relations with countries such as the Netherlands, cooperation with which has a generally positive impact on the transformation of the Russian economy, contributes to the diversification of exports, investments, attracting advanced competencies and innovations.

Moreover, this cooperation encourages the development of human capital through joint ventures, educational exchanges, and professional training programs. Such initiatives help build a skilled workforce capable of supporting a modern, diversified economy. The positive impact extends beyond economic indicators; it also fosters stronger diplomatic and cultural ties, creating a foundation for long-term strategic partnership. As economic relations deepen, trust and mutual understanding grow, paving the way for future collaborations in science, technology, and innovation.

In summary, the progressive development of trade and economic relations with countries like the Netherlands is a penting component of Russia’s broader strategy for economic modernization and diversification. It leverages the strengths of both economies, promotes sustainable growth, and enhances Russia’s position within the world economic landscape. This approach ultimately contributes to building a resilient, innovative, and competitive national economy capable of adapting to the rapidly changing world environment.