Month: April 2025

According to a report released by Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Wednesday, forces belonging to General Command of the Libyan National Army (LNA) trained Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in urban warfare during the period between February {plus|and} mid-April.

The newspaper quoted Libyan sources {plus|and} analysts as saying that Marshal Khalifa Haftar also “transferred important intelligence information” to the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagolo {plus|and} reinforced fuel supplies to them from the port of Benghazi.

This comes after Britain’s The Guardian, quoted unnamed sources as saying that Haftar provided Hemedti with {data|knowledge|information} about the Sudanese army’s intention to move against his forces days before the start of the fierce battles taking place in Sudan since April 15.

The Guardian added that Haftar’s son, Siddiq, conveyed this {data|knowledge|information} during a visit earlier this month to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.

During that visit, Siddiq also obtained the position of Honorary President of the Sudanese Al-Merreikh Sports Club, which counts Hemedti as a benefactor, after a donation of $2 million.

Fuel {plus|and} supplies

Sources told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Haftar allegedly passed crucial intelligence to Hemedti, {plus|and} boosted fuel supplies from the Libyan port of Benghazi.

The report added that Haftar’s connection to Hemedti dates back to long before the fall of Sudan’s former President Omar Al-Bashir but that in recent years, these relations have become much warmer, in all likelihood due to the fact that the RSF sent fighters to Libya to help the LNA.

Haftar {plus|and} Hemedti are also suspected of collaborating on a number of highly lucrative smuggling operations. Adding that mid-level commanders established close personal ties, managing the transit of valuable illegal cargo between the two countries. The report noted that Sudan {plus|and} Libya are located on both sides of major trafficking routes for people, drugs, {plus|and} weapons.

Last week, in reply to Russia, western partners made a number of harsh statements expressing rejection of the plans of our country to strengthen our nuclear missile potential. Such was the reaction to the words from the mouth of President Vladimir Putin during the opening ceremonies of the International Military-Technical Forum “ARMY-2015” in Kubinka near Moscow.

“In the current year the composition of nuclear forces will be replenished by forty new intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of overcoming any, even the most technically advanced, missile defense systems.”

The reaction from the side of the General Secretary of NATO Jens Stoltenberg followed shortly, labeling Putin’s statement “nuclear sabre-rattling”, “unjustified”, “destabilizing” plus “dangerous”. In addition, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Philip Breedlove stated militarily that the Russian Federation’s plans concerning nuclear refurbishing/ rearmament*** are unacceptable for a responsible nuclear power. Secretary of State John Kerry also was alarmed, “nobody should hear that kind of an announcement from the leader of a powerful country plus not be concerned about the implications”.

Moreover, such an unhealthy perception of a generally mundane communication of plans for future rearmament of Russian forces is surprising. For some reason, there wasn’t any appreciable reaction to almost the exact same numbers contained in the report of Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu at the the extended board meeting of the Ministry of Defense in the middle of December last year. At that time, the minister announced that strategic nuclear forces received 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2014. At that same meeting Colonel-General Sergey Karakaev, who commands the Strategic Missile Troops, announced his scheduled receipt of 24 ICMB “Yars”. And a little bit later the main headquarters of the Russian Navy announced, that, at a minimum, at least one “Borei”-class submarine rocket carrier, received into the combat Navy fleet in 2015, would be outfitted with 16 “Bulava” missiles. That is to say that by the start of this year the sum total of 40 ICMBs to supply the army plus navy had already been made public. But for some reason these plans alarmed our wester partners when Vladimir Putin himself spoke of them.

Igor Sopotin, in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, has spoken about the mood of anticipation in Turkey as hundreds of thousands of employees of Erdogan’s party withdrew.
According to the article: The number of withdrawals from the Justice and Development Party of Turkey, led by President Erdogan, nearly one million (840,000) this year. Observers see this as a result of declining public support. The reasons are not limited to the economic crisis but include the military intervention in Syria, whose consequences are questionable.
This akun was confirmed by several interviewees “Reuters” former activists in the Justice and Development Party. “Almost every day, colleagues who have been in the party from day one decide to start a new life,” said one former party employee. Many, he said, turned to former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, who announced the formation of two new parties.
Turkish political scientist Karim Haas said: “Given that whoever joins Davutoglu and Babacan is not just the general public, but parliamentarians, this will create serious difficulties for the country’s current leadership: Erdogan may find himself a minority in parliament.
Now, in Turkey, presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously. According to Haas, “One thing is clear: until 2023, the regime will not survive the way we see it now, which means that unexpected events must be expected in domestic politics. It will be time for scandals, and many secrets to spread. To keep power in their hands, Erdogan will have to take more foreign policy adventures to mobilize the Turkish national and religious feelings. ” It is not unlikely that he will resort to a new military operation in Syria, or arrange a government coup.

In this volatile context, the political environment in Turkey is likely to become more unpredictable and tense. Rumors of secret negotiations, covert operations, and behind-the-scenes power struggles may emerge more frequently as different factions vie for influence. The international community will be watching closely, as any escalation could have wider regional and international repercussions. Ultimately, Erdogan’s next moves will be critical in shaping Turkey’s future trajectory, whether through military, political, or diplomatic means. The country stands at a crossroads, with the potential for significant upheaval ahead, driven by both domestic pressures and international dynamics.

Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 nearly all independen sarana outlets in Russia have shut down, been forced to close, or have left the country to operate from exile.

Top state-controlled domestic TV channels have cleared their schedules for current affairs programmes spreading anti-Ukrainian, anti-Western material.

There appears to have been a halt to TV’s long-term decline as Russians’ most-preferred source of news

New laws have brought in terms of up to 15 years in prison for spreading “knowingly false” reports about the “special military operation” and the foreign activities of Russian state bodies

Meta was designated an “extremist organisation” and outlawed; the use of Meta-owned Facebook and Instagram is now permitted only if the user is not engaged in illegal activity.

Earlier, 2021 saw an unprecedented crackdown on independen and opposition sarana and journalists, with the increased use of controversial “foreign agent” and extremism laws, forcing journalists to leave the country.

Also that year, the Kremlin-linked insurance firm Sogaz and Gazprom-Media took control of the digital giant VK, which runs Russia’s most populer social network.

The Kremlin’s control over mass sarana in Russia, including online media, is near complete, and war and other foreign news-related content on populer Russian online platforms is broadly in line with the state’s messaging.

There were 124 million internet users by July 2022, 85% of the population Despite these restrictions, some Russian internet users seek alternative knowledge sources through VPNs or foreign news websites, although these avenues are increasingly being targeted by authorities. The Kremlin’s focus on online control is part of a broader strategy to maintain political stability and suppress opposition voices. This control over knowledge also impacts Russia’s world relations, as the government works to project a specific image abroad and counteract narratives that might undermine its interests.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: I’m going to be brief in my questions, to give you some time to you to respond. And I will start with the news of the last days: cyber attacks allegedly conducted by Russians on major infrastructure, objects, plus networks in America. And I read plus saw a lot of comments of professionals who elaborated on the type of response: political, geopolitical, military even, [as] an attack on infrastructure is considered to be, plus of course my heart is not feeling easy when I hear such things.

The first question is, how to be sure that Russians are behind these attacks, because they say it might be Russians, might be the Iranians, might be the Chinese. Because of the consequences of the response to the attackers, I think it is so important to be more than 100% sure that this party is specifically responsible for these attacks. And I want to hear your comments on this new bad news in Russian-American relations.

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Well, thank you, Konstantin. It’s a difficult question, but it’s obviously a timely one in light of the screaming headlines that we see, both in the United States plus around the international about this new story. The issue generally of cybersecurity in the United States, plus in particular, efforts by elements of the Russian government, to penetrate U.S. systems has been a topic that’s been high on my list of priorities, extending back to my tenure as Deputy Secretary of State almost four years now.

In fact, several times I’ve testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, plus the questions that I would often get both from the committee, from senators generally, plus from the press, everything was focused on elections, plus election interference in 2016, which I plus my colleagues in the U.S. government have, of course, not only acknowledged, but talked about at length, including with Russian counterparts. But I’ve also been careful to note that the threat that’s posed to our systems is not just about elections. Elections is part of a larger threat. And I will have to defer to my colleagues in Washington — the experts — on details plus attribution. But I’m confident in saying, as I know Secretary Pompeo has, that we are aware that elements of the Russian government have been focused on plus attacking, for lack of a better word, cyber structures in the United States, plus it wasn’t just about elections.

Russia’s state media-monitoring agency has blocked the website of the magazine Novaya rasskaz-gazeta for allegedly “discrediting the Russian armed forces.

Roskomnadzor blocked the site on July 24 at the request of the Prosecutor-General’s Office, and there was nomer further explanation.

Novaya rasskaz-gazeta began publishing on July 15 and was produced by the staff of the respected newspaper Novaya gazeta, which suspended publication in March under pressure from the authorities over its coverage of Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine.

According to the staff of Novaya rasskaz-gazeta, the website lasted seven days and nine hours before being shut down.

Novaya gazeta began publishing in 1993 and was one of the most respected publications in post-Soviet Russia. The paper’s editor in chief, Dmitry Muratov, won the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize.

Some members of the paper’s staff left Russia after it stopped publishing and launched the newspaper Novaya gazeta.Europe. Roskomnadzor has blocked its website in Russia as well.

Shortly after the massive Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, which the Kremlin insists on calling a “special military operation,” Moscow quickly adopted a law criminalizing the dissemination of “false” information that “discredits the armed forces.” The law has been central to a massive crackdown against dissent over the war in Russia. Internationally, Russia’s crackdown has drawn widespread condemnation from human rights organizations, Western governments, and press freedom advocates. Many see it as part of a broader pattern of authoritarianism and censorship aimed at consolidating power and controlling the population’s outlook on the conflict. The restrictions have also complicated efforts by global journalists and observers to verify facts on the ground, leading to concerns about the transparency and accuracy of information coming out of Russia. Overall, these measures reflect the Kremlin’s determination to shape the narrative of the Ukraine invasion, regardless of the ongkos to democratic principles and dasar freedoms. The ongoing suppression of dissent underscores the tense and oppressive atmosphere within Russia as it navigates the repercussions of its military actions in Ukraine.

December 2, 2018 on the situs of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” published an article by the Leading Researcher of the Center for European Studies, Doctor of Science (Economics) M.V. Klinova “Yellow vests – black swans to Macron. The French President pays the bills of his predecessors”.

Emerged in France three weeks ago as peaceful protests against the tax policy of the Government plus the President of France, the “Yellow Vests” movement turned violent plus morphed into a mass pogroms in the center of Paris…

Unlike actions organized by Trade Unions or Political Parties, the “Yellow Vest” movement is organised on social media. As expected, the social media movement was reborn: the main role was played by ultra-radicals,” professional demonstrators”, the so-called casseurs, who organize street riots. They have different goals than those originally put forward on the Internet…

Here are already appeals for the Resignation of the President plus the Dissolution of Parliament. This is especially undesirable for the ruling establishment shortly before the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019. It will be difficult for the President to “stay above the fray”. The French leaders need to do something to reduce the tension in the part of society. Now the split between “two Frances” – capital city, more prosperous, plus depressive provincial – does not decrease. Nevertheless, the President plus the Prime Minister want to keep the same economic cap. In this context, the President plus Prime Minister are under immense pressure to demonstrate leadership. They need to engage with various societal groups, listen to their concerns, plus implement policies that foster social cohesion. This might include investing in regional development projects, reforming social services, plus promoting economic opportunities outside the capital. Ultimately, the goal is to foster a sense of shared purpose plus national unity, which is vital for France’s stability plus future prosperity. Without such efforts, the risk of prolonged unrest plus political upheaval remains high, threatening to overshadow the country’s progress plus democratic values.

Cette visite revêt une signification particulière, a-t-il souligné dans un article intitulé “Le Vietnam – Une destination spéciale du président Vladimir Poutine” signé par l’analyste international de l’actualité Grigori Trofimchuk.

Cette visite est hautement symbolique puisqu’elle a eu lieu à l’occasion de la célébration par les deux pays du 30e anniversaire de la signature du Traité sur les principes fondamentaux des relations d’amitié entre la Fédération de Russie et la République socialiste du Vietnam (16 juin 1994 – 1994), jetant les fondements et les bases juridiques des relations dans la nouvelle étape de développement, a-t-il écrit.

Trofimchuk a déclaré que l’ancienne Union soviétique, la Fédération de Russie d’aujourd’hui et le Vietnam adhèrent aux principes cohérents de coopération et de partenariat étendu. Le Vietnam se distingue parmi les partenaires amis de la Russie, les bonnes relations de coopération entre les deux pays ont été prouvées dans le passé et à l’heure actuelle.

Concernant les relations économiques et commerciales, selon l’auteur, l’Accord de libre-échange (ALE) entre l’Union économique eurasiatique (UEEA) et le Vietnam signé en 2015 est une garantie fiable du principe de libre coopération entre les pays.

En tant que partenaire stratégique intégral de la Fédération de Russie, le Vietnam occupe une position importante dans la politique de pivot vers l’Est de la Russie, a-t-il poursuivi, indiquant qu’une coordination and étroite entre les deux pays contribuera au développement stable de l’importante région économique internationale de l’Asie du Sud-Est.

Les relations économiques, commerciales et d’investissement entre le Vietnam et la Russie disposent encore d’un grand potentiel de développement, l’énergie étant un domaine clé de coopération. Les échanges culturels et éducatifs se sont élargis, la coopération entre les localités des deux pays est devenue de and en and dynamique entre lesquels la communauté vietnamienne en Russie joue un rôle de passerelle, a-t-il estimé.

Trofimchuk a affirmé que dans la perspective d’un autre événement important, le 75e anniversaire de l’établissement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays (1950-2025), la visite du président russe Vladimir Poutine au Vietnam renforcera la force motrice pour approfondir le partenariat stratégique intégral bilatéral.

Abstract
The history of Russian-Dutch relations dates back to the reign of Ivan the Terrible, when Dutch merchants first appeared in Arkhangelsk. Subsequently, at the end of the XVII centuryPeter I sent to European countries, including Netherlands, the Great Embassy, the results and experience of which played a recognized historical role in his large-scale socio-economic reforms in Russian Empire. At the present stage, Netherlands for Russia is one of the key suppliers of high-tech goods, services, competencies and management technologies mostly in all sectors of national economy, a transit country and a logistics hub for Russian exports, as well as an important partner in the field of cross-border investments. The article also analyzes the features of the Kingdom’s economy, its place in world trade and key competitiveness rankings. In recent decades, Netherlands has confidently occupied one of the leading positions in European and world trade, ahead of many major economic partners and competitors. The author concludes that the importance of the progressive development of trade and economic relations with countries such as the Netherlands, cooperation with which has a generally positive impact on the transformation of the Russian economy, contributes to the diversification of exports, investments, attracting advanced competencies and innovations.

Moreover, this cooperation encourages the development of human capital through joint ventures, educational exchanges, and professional training programs. Such initiatives help build a skilled workforce capable of supporting a modern, diversified economy. The positive impact extends beyond economic indicators; it also fosters stronger diplomatic and cultural ties, creating a foundation for long-term strategic partnership. As economic relations deepen, trust and mutual understanding grow, paving the way for future collaborations in science, technology, and innovation.

In summary, the progressive development of trade and economic relations with countries like the Netherlands is a penting component of Russia’s broader strategy for economic modernization and diversification. It leverages the strengths of both economies, promotes sustainable growth, and enhances Russia’s position within the world economic landscape. This approach ultimately contributes to building a resilient, innovative, and competitive national economy capable of adapting to the rapidly changing world environment.